Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

MACHELLE CANFIELD, Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs. LAYTON CITY, a Utah Municipality,
Defendant and Appellee. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stanley J. Preston, Camille N. Johnson, Judith D. Wolferts; Maralyn M. Reger; Snow, Christensen &
Martineau; attorneys for appellee.
Brad C. Smith; Benjamin C. Rasmussen; Stevenson & Smith; attorneys for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Canfield v. Layton City, No. 20030212 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4250

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Court of Appeals Case
No. 20030212-CA

vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah Municipality,
Defendant/Appellee.

On Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the Honorable Michael G. Allphin,
Second District Court for Davis County, State of Utah

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
Stevenson & Smith, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801) 394 -4573
Stanley J. Preston, No. 4119
Camille N. Johnson, No. 5494
Judith D. Wolferts, No. 7023
Maralyn M. Reger, No. 8468
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

NOV 0 h 2003
Pautetta Stagg
Clerk of the Court

BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MACHELLE CANFIELD,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Court of Appeals Case
No. 20030212-CA

vs.
LAYTON CITY, a Utah Municipality,
Defendant/Appellee.

On Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the Honorable Michael G.
Second District Court for Davis County, State of Utah

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Brad C. Smith, No. 6656
Benjamin C Rasmussen, No. 9462
Stevenson & Smith, P.C.
3986 Washington Boulevard
Ogden, UT 84403
Telephone: (801) 394 -4573
Stanley J. Preston, No. 4119
Camille N. Johnson, No. 5494
Judith D. Wolferts, No. 7023
Maralyn M. Reger, No. 8468
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

Table of Contents

Table of Contents

ii

Table of Authorities

iii

Argument

1

I.

Plaintiff Is Not Subject to the Notice Requirements of the Utah
Government Immunity Act

1

A.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Not Statutory in Nature

1

B.

Plaintiff's Claims Sound in Contract

2

II.

Defendant Layton City's Defense of Res Judicata Is Not Before This
Court
5

III.

Defendant Layton City's Defense of Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies Lacks Evidentiary Support

7

A.

Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Is Not Properly
Before This Court
7

B.

Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Does Not Create
an Exhaustion Requirement
9

Conclusion

11

ii

Table of Authorities
Cases
Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, 20 P.3d 388

4

Beard v. Baum, 796 P.2d 1344 (Alaska 1990)

9

Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121 (Utah 1986)

7

Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 257 P.2d 540 (Utah 1953)
Dennis v. Vasquez, 2003 UT App 168, 72 P.3d 135
Heinecke v. Dep't. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

7, 8
6
10

Knight v. Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App 100, 46 P.3d 247

1,2

Koenig v. City of South Haven, 597 N.W.2d 99 (Mich. 1999)

3

Merrilees v. Treasurer, State of Vermont, 618 A.2d 1314 (Vt. 1992)
5
Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

4

Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, 34 P.3d 180

9

Pratt v. Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991)

8

Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 154 (Utah 1963)

8

Rules, Statutes, and Constitutional Provisions
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41

6

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815

1,2

Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-1, et seq. (1999)

iii

1

Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-10

1

Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-11.5

1

Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-14

1

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5

5

Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

3

Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)

5

Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c)

5

Utah R. Civ. P. 9

4

iv

ARGUMENT
I.

Plaintiff Is Not Subject to the Notice Requirements of the Utah
Government Immunity Act.
A.

Plaintiff's Claims Are Not Statutory in Nature.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are not contractual because they
arise from a city's statutory powers. In support of this assertion, Defendants rely
on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815 and the decision of this Court in Knight v. Salt
Lake County, 2002 UT App 100, 46 P.3d 247. However, the decision in Knight
arises from an entirely different statutory scheme.
In Knight, the plaintiffs were specifically employed pursuant to the County
Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-1, et seq. (1999). Knight,
at 1J7, n. 6. The Knight court held that any contracts or written personnel policies
and manuals were specifically required by statute, and so could not give rise to
an employment contract. Id. at fflf 11-13. Indeed, the County Personnel
Management Act, which applies only to counties, and has no counterpart in the
municipal code, provides specific employment guidelines for county employees.
The act also provides reciprocal protections, which protect the employees and
obviate the need to allow contractual claims.1
1

For example, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-10 requires establishment of a
grievance procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-11.5 requires that counties act in
compliance with the Utah Labor Code. The act also provides criminal
punishments for violations. Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-14.

1

No such statute or protections was in place to reduce the contractual
significance of the city's policies in this case. For the city to claim that Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-815 is something akin to the County Personnel Management Act, so
as to make the instant claims statutory rather than contractual is an unreasonable
stretch of the imagination. Section 10-3-815 states simply, "The governing body
of each municipality shall prescribe rules and regulations which are not
inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems best for the efficient
administration, organization, operation, conduct and business of the municipality."
This statute does not provide any regulation of specific employment practices as
does the statutory scheme at issue in Knight, nor does it give rise to the
contractual rights, which Plaintiff claims Defendant violated. Indeed, section 103-815 has no application to the case at bar.
B.

Plaintiffs Claims Sound in Contract.

Plaintiff's complaint does not make a single reference to any statute as
basis for its claims. Instead, the complaint clearly implicates a contractual
dispute. The Complaint makes specific allegations regarding sick leave,
accounting for hours, and other contract issues. (Br. of Appellant, Exhibit B, ffij 411.) The Complaint also alleges violations of Defendant's written personnel
policies, which have contractual importance. (Br. of Appellant, Exhibit B, ffl[1213,17.) Given the Defendant's violation of its own policies, and unfair treatment
2

of Plaintiff, the contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing also comes into
play, again, a contract claim. Finally, the Complaint seeks remedies of a
contractual nature,2 i.e., general damages, reinstatement, and costs of court. (Br.
of Appellant, Exhibit B, Prayer.)
Accordingly, there is an issue of fact as to whether the provisions of the
city's policy manual created a contract, for which the notice requirements of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act are waived. In this case, the city's policy
manual has not been made part of a record.3 Instead, because no discovery has
yet commenced, all that is before this Court are the complaint's allegations that
personnel policies existed, and that Defendant violated its own policies, which is
insufficient basis to grant a Motion to Dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Defendant seems to object that Plaintiff did not plead its case with sufficient
specificity. (See, Br. of Appellee, at p. 15-16.) However, a cause of action based

defendant claims that Plaintiff request damages based in tort in response
to interrogatories. However, those answers were provided in response to
interrogatories in the previous lawsuit, which was removed to federal court, and
subsequently dismissed. They were not given in conjunction with the instant
case. Furthermore, even if there were contract and tort damages sought, the
contract claims should still be allowed to proceed, even if the tort based claims
are dismissed for failure to comply with statutory notice provisions. See, Koenig
v. City of South Haven, 597 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Mich. 1999).
3

While the Defendant has attached two portions of city employment policies
to its appellate brief, as is discussed more fully in Section Part III, infra, these
exhibits are not part of the trial court's record, and consequently should not be
considered by this Court on appeal.
3

in contract is not subject to the pleading requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 9.
Indeed, in the context of a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint
should be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, indulging all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See, Mounteer v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). As such, if the factual
allegations of the Complaint, standing alone, can be reasonably construed to
allege claims sounding in contract, it was error for the trial court to grant
Defendant Layton City's Motion to Dismiss. This is such a case.
In Utah, the elements of a prima facie for breach of contract are 1) a
contract, 2) performance by the party seeking recovery, 3) breach of the contract
by the other party, and 4) damages. See, Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT
20,1[14, 20 P.3d 388. As mentioned previously, Plaintiff clearly implicated the
existence of a contract by reference to Defendant Layton City's written personnel
policies and other contractual issues.4 The complaint also references a long
history of Plaintiff performing under her employment contract with the city. (Br. of
Appellant, Exh. B, 1J4.) Plaintiff alleges breach of the contract by reference to
deviations from written city policies, disparate treatment, and a constructive
termination from employment. (Br. of Appellant, Exh. B, ffl[12-17.) The prayer for
4

Plaintiff's initial brief also demonstrates that written policies of a
governmental entity may give rise to contract claims. (Br. of Appellant, pp. 1315.)
4

relief sets forth an allegation of damages. As such, the Complaint sets forth a
prima facie case of breach of contract.
Given that the allegations of Plaintiffs complaint relate to contract issues,
and that the relief sought is contractual in nature, Plaintiff was not subject to
government immunity notice requirements under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5.
Plaintiff was entitled to forego the notice requirements applicable to tort claims
and file her claims in state court. The district court's ruling to the contrary was in
error, and should be reversed.

II.

Defendant Layton City's Defense of Res Judicata Is Not Before This
Court.
Defendant Layton City cannot properly raise the defense of res judicata at

this stage of the proceedings. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), "In pleading to a
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... res judicata ..." Under
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h), with limited exceptions, "A party waives all defenses and
objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply..." If res judicata
is not raised in the pleadings, the defense may not be raised at trial or on appeal.
See, ££,, Merrilees v. Treasurer, State of Vermont, 618 A.2d 1314,1315 (Vt.
1992).
In this case, Defendant did not raise the doctrine of res judicata as an

5

affirmative defense in its Motion to Dismiss. In its motion, Defendant relied solely
on failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity
Act. Having never raised res judicata before the trial court, Defendant cannot
raise the issue for the first time before this Court on appeal. Because the
defense of res judicata was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss, nor at any other
time in the lower court proceedings, this Court should not consider the issue now.
In addition, even if the issue of res judicata were properly before this Court,
Plaintiff's action is not barred. Before the doctrine of res judicata applies, there
must be a final judgment on the merits. See, Dennis v. Vasquez, 2003 UT App
168, j[4, 72 P.3d 135. The federal court dismissal of Plaintiffs claim did not result
in an adjudication on the merits. Plaintiffs claim that the case was dismissed with
prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. However, the very exhibits Defendant cites to
support its defense disproves such an assertion. In their motion and
memorandum to dismiss the complaint in federal court, while Defendant sought
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, no mention of Rule 41 was ever
made. (See, Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 9.) Likewise, Judge Kimball's order did not
refer to Rule 41, nor was the case dismissed with prejudice, but merely dismissed
without specifics. (See, Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 10.) As such, dismissal of the
case did not result in a final adjudication on the merits, and res judicata does not
apply.
6

III.

Defendant Layton City's Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative
Remedies Lacks Evidentiary Support.
A.

Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Is Not Properly Before
This Court.

Defendant Layton City argues that Plaintiff deprived the district court, and
concomitantly this Court, of subject matter jurisdiction by failing to exhaust
internal administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. In support of this assertion,
Defendant attached two excerpts appearing to be from a city personnel policy,
and argued that they created an absolute requirement for Plaintiff to appeal her
constructive termination through the city's appeal procedures. No such evidence
was ever presented to the trial court below, nor was it ever properly introduced
into the record in this case.
An appellate court should not consider evidence outside of the record on
appeal. For example, in Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 122-23 (Utah
1986), the Defendants urged the Utah Supreme Court to overturn a summary
judgment order based on responses to interrogatories and requests for
admission, which were attached to the appellate brief to support the existence of
factual issues. The court wrote, "Because these 'answers' are outside the record,
we cannot consider them." Id. at 123.
In Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 257 P.2d 540 (Utah 1953), the
Court was referred to an unsigned stipulation present to the lower court. It wrote:
7

The record in this case is extremely brief, and the facts presented therein
so fragmentary and incomplete as to make it impossible for this court to
render a decision without looking dehors the record,-a process we cannot
indulge.... We cannot consider facts stated in the briefs which may be true
but absent in the official record.
These decisions are consistent with other Utah caselaw rejecting consideration of
evidence outside the record. See, e.g.., Pratt v. Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d
1169,1172 (Utah 1991 )(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief,
which had no substantiation in the record); Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 154,
155 (Utah 1963)(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief, where
facts before trial court were stipulated to in chambers without preservation of a
record).
In the appeal before the Court, Defendant Layton City has attempted to
circumvent its obligation to present evidence and establish any issues for appeal
through the record. Indeed, it is attempting to create an ad hoc record on appeal,
without basis for doing so. Given the improper inclusion of the policy manual
excerpts in the Appellee's Brief, this Court should give the evidence no
consideration. As such, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Plaintiff
should have exhausted administrative remedies, and this defense should not be
used to uphold an otherwise improper dismissal of Plaintiff's claims.

8

B.

Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Does Not Create an
Exhaustion Requirement.

Even assuming arguendo that the policy manual excerpts provided by
Defendant are properly before this Court, they do not establish exhaustion as a
prerequisite. First, exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would have
been futile and useless. In Beard v. Baum, 796 P.2d 1344 (Alaska 1990), the
State of Alaska alleged that a constructively discharged employee could not sue
absent exhausting contractual remedies, as is alleged by Defendant Layton City
in the case at bar. The Beard Court found that because the grievance procedure
required the cooperation of the plaintiffs supervisors, a constructively discharged
employee could not be required to exhaust such remedies, as such an attempt
would have been futile. Id. at 1349. Similarly, in Utah, exhaustion of
administrative remedies may be excused when it would serve no useful purpose.
See, Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f l 4 , 34 P.3d 180.
In this matter, Plaintiffs constructive discharge was the result of coercive
threats by supervisors who would have had extensive influence over any
contractual city appellate procedures. Under that policy, the very supervisors
who coerced Plaintiff into resigning bore the responsibility of advising Plaintiff of
her appeal rights. (Br. of Appellee, Exh. 13, p.1.) No evidence suggests
Plaintiffs supervisors so advised her. Furthermore, those same supervisors who

9

forced Plaintiff into resigning would no doubt exert significant influence over the
internal appellate procedure. Given these facts, requiring Plaintiff to exhaust
these local contractual remedies would be futile, and would serve no useful
purpose.
Furthermore, failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive
the courts of subject matter jurisdiction, when resort to the administrative
remedies is not mandatory. In Heinecke v. Dep't. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Respondent claimed that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
Petitioner did not take an extra review step, which was permitted him, but not
required, under the statute. The Heinecke court concluded that because the
administrative remedy was not mandatory, failure to exhaust did not deprive the
court of subject matter jurisdiction.
In the instant case, even though Defendant may have statutory authority to
create rules and regulations, Defendant's rules do not make appeal with city
appellate processes mandatory. Defendant's policy states, "In all cases where an
appointive officer or regular full time employee, other than the City Manager and
heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a position with less
remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full-time employee shall have
the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter."
10

(Br. of Appellee, Exh. 13, p.2.)(Emphasis added.) Defendant's policy does not
state that the employee "shall" appeal the discharge, or that the employee "must"
appeal the discharge prior to taking legal action. Instead, Defendant's policy
makes an internal appeal an option, stating the "employee shall have the right to
appeal" the termination. Because use of Defendant's appellate procedure was
not mandatory under their own policies, Defendant cannot now complain that this
Court and the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case at bar.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs complaint in this matter did not arise from any rights derived in
state statute, nor was it based in any statutory scheme, as Defendant Layton City
alleges. Plaintiffs complaint sets forth allegations establishing a prima facie case
of breach of contract. Because claims sounding in contract are not subject to the
notice requirements of the Utah Government Immunity Act, the district court's
arbitrary dismissal of this matter was error. Furthermore, Defendant has waived
the defense of res judicata, and Defendant's exhaustion defense is unsupported
by the record or in law. As such, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the district court's dismissal of her contract claims.
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